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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the Cherokee judicial system harkens back to centuries of
history and tradition, but in ways that may be foreign to readers. Before the
adoption of various tribal statutes and a constitution in the early decades of
the 1800s, the Cherokee legal system adjudicated disputes through the clan
system.' Clans were "asked to decide on causation, to offer forgiveness, or
to accept compensation." 2 The seven Cherokee clans maintained the fabric
of Cherokee society, and it "was from the strength of the clans that Cherokee
laws received their force and energy." 3 It appears the primary goal of
Cherokee law was harmony.4 That constant desire for harmony "meant that
many domestic injuries would be overlooked, forgiven, or mediated; the
honorable man did not seek revenge, he sought harmony." 5
Thus,
punishment in early Cherokee life has been described as "a loose form of
ostracism." 6 "Public opinion backed by fear of shame and disgrace" was
the manner in which laws were enforced in the Cherokee towns, which
lacked any central authority or enforcement agencies.7
With the tribe confronted by the challenges of the new United States
government and its policies, the Cherokee developed a court system. Due
to these events, the Cherokee adopted a constitution in 1827, and with that
adoption the Cherokee established a more formal court system modelled
directly on the American framework.8
Soon thereafter, however, the
Cherokee were removed to the west with the passage and ratification of the
Indian Removal Act of 1830.9 The history behind how the Cherokee court
system came to be is a fascinating story worth telling, and it is a history that
must be appreciated by practitioners litigating in western North Carolina.
The first part of this Article will explore that history, and the second part
will explain the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion that has resulted from
that history.

1.

JOHN PHILLIP REID, A LAW OF BLOOD: THE PRIMITIVE LAW OF THE CHEROKEE

NATION 233 (2006).

2.
3.
4.
5.

Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 236.
Id.

6. See Fred Gearing, Priests and Warriors: Social Structuresfor Cherokee Politics in
the 18th Century, 64 no. 5 pt. 2 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 109 (1962).

7.

REID,

supra note 1, at 244.

8. See Laws of the Cherokee Nation: Adopted by the Councilat Various Periods 118-

30 (1852), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/american-indian-consts/PDF/28014183.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/7W5R-C2F3] [hereinafter Laws of the CherokeeNation].
9. Indian Removal Act, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
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II. THE CHEROKEE COURT

A. The Cherokee Court Establishedin 1820
In its effort to remain in the Southeastern United States and avoid the
loss of its lands and forcible removal to the west, the Cherokee tribe
organized its government and court system on the United States'
three-branch political structure. The first Cherokee tribal court, created
under the new judicial branch, was established on October 20, 1820, to
convene "councils to administer justice in all causes and complaints that
may be brought forward for trial."" That same year, the Cherokee court
heard its first case in November of 1820." "All in all, the Cherokee
Supreme Court heard 237 cases from 1823 to 1835, 213 civil matters and
twenty-four criminal ones."' 2 On July 26, 1827, the Cherokee tribe created
a constitution which not only organized the Cherokee government and
provided for individual rights, but also created a separate and independent
judicial branch.' 3 Article V of the Cherokee Constitution established a
Supreme Court and lesser trial courts, thereby creating an independent,
co-equal judicial branch of government.'
In the 1820s and 1830s, "[t]he original Cherokee Supreme Court was
a symbol of idealism, relevance, and defiance."" The Cherokee courts were
accepted by many citizens and even some government agents while other
states and their political leaders contemporaneously took a hostile view of
the Cherokee government. 16 One example that illustrates recognition of the
Cherokee court system is when the United States, through its agents,

10. Laws of the Cherokee Nation, supra, note 8 at 11.
11. J. Matthew Martin, Chief Justice Martin and the Origins of Westernized Tribal
Jurisprudence,4 ELON L. REV. 31, 37 (2012) [hereinafter ChiefJustice Martin] (citing John

Louis Dickson, The Judicial History of the Cherokee Nation from 1721 to 1835 (1964)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma)).
12. Id. at 39.
13. See Laws of the Cherokee Nation, supra note 8, at 118-30.
14. See id. at 126.
15. ChiefJustice Martin, supra note 11, at 52.
16. See George Gilmer, Correspondence between the Gov. of Georgia and the Sec. of
War, CHEROKEE PHOENIX & INDIANS' ADVOCATE (New Echota), Oct. 22, 1831. ("Meetings
of the Indian people have been called in most of their towns, at which their chiefs have used
these [Supreme Court] opinions to convince them that their rights of self-government and
soil were independent of the United States and Georgia, and would be secured to them
through the Supreme Court, and the change (which they represent to be certain) in the

administration of the General Government.") (sharing his disapproval of the Cherokee legal
system).
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appeared before the tribal courts in 1829, thereby submitting the United
States to the jurisdiction of the Cherokee tribe."
The Cherokee court system from 1823 to 1835 was a valid and honorable
court system accepted by the United States, even if the individual states felt
otherwise. 8
Recognition of the Cherokees' forward thinking and
establishment of a legal system dependent upon the rule of law is found even
earlier inthe Cherokee Nation Treaty of Hopewell from the late 1700s. 19 The
progressive attitude adopted by the Cherokee has been described by one
scholar as follows:
[T]he Cherokees seem to have possessed to a larger degree than any other
important Indian nation-an ability to accept new law and forget old ways.
During the early decades of the nineteenth century, they would discard all
their primitive customs, turn their back on their legal past, create a new
judicial system borrowed almost entirely from their American neighbors,
and do so with a success that would make them both the leaders and the envy
of their fellow Indians. 20

Forward thinking and a willingness to change and acculturate proved to
be inadequate. The politics of the day, and an insatiable desire for land,
would result in the treaty of New Echota and the removal of the Cherokee
to Oklahoma. The Trail of Tears ended the Cherokee court in the
Southeastern states. The Cherokee Tribal Court would rest dormant for the
next 165 years until the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians would re-establish
a Cherokee tribal court. Before discussing the Cherokee court of today,
17. See J. Matthew Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal
Jurisdictionby the Cherokee Supreme Court: 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L. REv. 27, 57-59

(2009) [hereinafter Exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction] ("[The case of Thomas Ligon,
occurring on April 11, 1829,] and the set of documents which memorialize it, demonstrate
that the Federal government was willing to use the resources of the Tribal Courts, including
the services of two Judges of the Cherokee Supreme Court, to further the interests of the
United States.").
18. See Exercise of CriminalJurisdiction,supra note 17, at 59 ("On the frontier, access
to the Courts of the United States might involve a journey of days or even weeks. That
agents of the United States government would seek out respectable Cherokee Judges for
assistance in an urgent situation reflects the pragmatism of the frontier. But it reflects

something else, too. This reaching out also underscores that, to the Indian Agent, the
Cherokee Court system was recognized as honorable and trustworthy. It also appears that
its jurisdiction was satisfactory to the United States. If it were not, the Agents would
doubtless have turned elsewhere.").
19. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Perfect Copy: Indian Culture and Tribal Law, 2
YELLOW MED. REV. 95, 103 (2007) [hereinafter A Perfect Copy] ("The Cherokee Nation

long has had a tribal court system from the Treaty of Hopewell period from the late 1700s to
the Removal era, and then again from the early

1840s

until the United States terminated the

Nation.").
20. REm, supra note 1, at 272.
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however, we must learn how the courts of the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians functioned between 1835 and 1999 in North Carolina.
B. Courts ofIndian Offenses in Indian Country
The remnants of the Cherokees who stayed behind in western North
Carolina formed what later became known as the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians; the federal government recognized the North Carolina Cherokees
as an Indian tribe in 1924.21 The Eastern Cherokee worked closely with
local law enforcement and cooperated with state prosecutions of crimes that
occurred on the Cherokee tribe's lands. 22 The concepts of a modern court,
based upon the three-branch federal system, continued to find acceptance
with the majority of the Cherokee people. This is understandable because
for 100 years there was an ongoing question of whether the Cherokee who
remained in the state were a separate Indian tribe, and thus non-citizens, or
citizens of North Carolina. The Cherokee who refused to relocate to
Oklahoma under the Treaty of New Echota faced a nearly insurmountable
task. While the historical reasons are numerous and complex, being a
Cherokee in North Carolina after 1838 meant there were no tribal lands for
tribal members, and without a tribe there was no tribal court. Navigating
this existence was a difficult experience, made more challenging with the
destruction brought by the Civil War in the 1860s.
Following the Civil War, renewed questions about the legal status of
the Cherokee in North Carolina arose.23 Adding to these external events
wrought with confusion was the additional uncertainty pertaining to the
legal title of most Cherokee lands, which at that time were titled in the name
of William Holland Thomas.24 When, after the Civil War, Colonel Thomas
became mentally ill and was committed to a mental asylum; ownership and
title questions to these same Indian lands abounded with no forthcoming
answer.2 History and circumstances of simple survival may, in the end,

21. See Act Providing for the final disposition of the affairs of the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians of North Carolina, ch. 253, 43 Stat. 376 (1924), repealed by Pub. L.

106-462, title I, § 106(a)(1), 114 Stat. 2007 (2000).
22. See Articles of a treaty, concluded at New Echota in the State of Georgia on the 29th
day of Decr. 1835 by General William Carroll and John F. Schermerhorn commissioners on
the part of the United States and the Chiefs Head Men and People of the Cherokee tribe of
Indians, Art. XII, Cherokee-U.S., Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 [hereinafter Treaty at New
Echota].

23. See United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1931).
24. See E. STANLEY GODBOLD, JR. & MATTIE U. RUSSELL, CONFEDERATE COLONEL AND
CHEROKEE CHIEF: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM HOLLAND THOMAS 138, 138-39 (1990).
25. See id.
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explain why the Eastern Band of Cherokee were so adaptable to new legal
institutions and the doctrines upon which they rested.
The first organized court of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians,
after their removal, was the Cherokee CFR court, which came into existence
on July 28, 1980.26 However, before discussing that court, it is important
to understand the story behind the Courts of Indian Offenses that were
popping up throughout the rest of the country nearly a century prior.
In 1849, Congress moved the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) into the
newly created Department of the Interior as one of its founding agencies. 27
From the new Department of the Interior arose the Court of Indian Offenses.
The creator of the Courts of Indian Offenses was Henry Moore Teller, 28 a
former Colorado Senator. Prior to the establishment of these courts, which
brought an adversarial court system based upon the English-American
adversarial model, the tribes primarily used their own internal laws and
customs for dispute resolution.
Teller advised Hiram Price, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, that there existed a "great hindrance to the
civilization of the Indians" if they continued to use custom and tribal
ceremonies.29 Teller also observed that if these native customs, practices,
and rituals continued, "it [would] be extremely difficult to accomplish much
towards the civilization of the Indians while these adverse influences are
allowed to exist." 30 Teller created these administrative courts to assuage his
concern that "civilization and savagery cannot dwell together." 1 Therefore,
the stated purpose of the Courts of Indian Offenses was to "accomplish the
ultimate abolishment of the evil practices" by Indians and tribes. 32 To
achieve that purpose, these courts would create a unique set of rules, which
would apply throughout all of these courts in Indian country. 33 These new
rules were approved by Secretary Teller on April 10, 1883, and the Court
of Indian Offenses was established with both criminal and civil codes and
accompanying rules of procedure under the Code of Federal Regulations

26. See Wildcatt v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d 870, 871 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
27. See Act of Mar. 3, 1849, 9 Stat. 395 (codified as 43 U.S.C. § 1451).
28.

See

WILLIAM

T.

HAGAN,

INDIAN

POLICE

AND

JUDGES:

EXPERIMENTS

IN

ACCULTURATION AND CONTROL 107 (William H. Goetzmann et al. eds., 1966).
29.

FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY

Prucha ed., 3d ed. 2000); see also HAGAN, supra note 28, at

30.
31.

159

(Francis P.

107-08.

See PRUCHA, supra note 29, at 160; see also HAGAN supra note 28, at 108-09.
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, H.R. Ex. Doc. No. 48-1, pt. 5, at III

(1883).
32. HAGAN, supra note 28, at 109.

33. See id.
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("CFR").3 4 Under the CFR, federal officials have continued to modify,
amend, and supplement these same rules and regulations of the CFR courts
since 1883.
The CFR courts functioned as the adjudicative body on tribal lands
from 1883 onwards. The judge of the courts was appointed by the federal
Indian Agent for that particular tribe.35 These Indian Agents, located on
each reservation, undertook the task of criminalizing cultural practices,
dances, certain actions of tribal governments, and ceremonies deemed
unacceptable. 36 Soon after the CFR courts were established, a case was
brought seeking to ascertain the legality of the Courts of Indian Offenses.
The United States federal courts found the CFR Courts lawful in United
States v. Clapox.37 The Clapox Court, bending to then-existing Indian
policy and using eerily similar language as that used by Secretary Teller to
create the Courts of Indian Offenses in the first instance, ruled that the
38
Department of Interior possessed the authority to establish CFR courts.
The Court stated:
"[C]ourts of Indian offenses" are not the constitutional courts ... but mere
educational and disciplinary instrumentalities, by whichthe governmentofthe
United States is endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition of these
dependent tribes .... for the purpose of acquiring the habits, ideas, and
39
aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the uncivilized man.

Examples of punishments in 1892, as provided by the rules of the Courts
of Indian Offenses, included "up to five days' imprisonment for failure to do
road work and up to six months for medicine men convicted a second time of
While these CFR courts
interfering with the civilization programs."40
insidious purpose was
true
their
claimed to be forums to adjudicate disputes,
to destroy Indian cultural practices such as dancing, self-governance,
consultation with medicine people, and the very fabric of the cohesive bond

34. See id.; Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counselfor Indians Accused of Crime: A
MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 335-43 (2013). See

Tribal and CongressionalImperative, 18

generally SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DoG's CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL
LAW, AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 175 (1994) (explaining the

Court of Indian Offenses was established using the Code of Federal Regulations and for this
reason these courts are commonly referred to as "CFR Courts"); MATTHEW FLETCHER,
AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW 68 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 2011); WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 70 (West Academic ed., 5th ed. 2009).
35. Creel, supra note 34, at 340.

36. See id.
37. United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575, 577 (D. Or. 1888).
38. See id.; HAGAN, supra note 28, at 148.
39. Clapox, 35 F. at 577.
40. HAGAN, supra note 28, at 120.
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found among members of an Indian tribe.4'
The laws developed and
enforced in the Courts of Indian Offenses provide "an excellent illustration of
how the government hoped to use the power inherent in the Indian police
and Courts of Indian Offenses to coerce acculturation." 4 2
Soon, however, the policy of the United States changed. "The decline
in importance of Indian courts and Indian police stemmed directly from the
impact of the Dawes Act of 1887."43 With the desire to terminate tribes and
distribute all of their lands, the need to develop and operate CFR courts
correspondingly diminished. Other reasons causing the decline in Courts of
Indian Offenses in the late 1800s were expanding federal courtjurisdiction on
Indian lands following passage of the Major Crimes Act,' upholding the
Major Crimes Act as a lawful exercise of Congressional authority over
Indians and Indian tribes; 45 and increasing the number of states admitted to
the Union.46
Over time, the Courts of Indian Offenses became "fixtures" in tribal
communities. 47 However, at the time of their creation, the Courts of Indian
Offenses were only established where they were considered to be practical
and desirable; this excluded the Five Civilized Tribes, the Indians of New
York, the Osage, the Pueblos, and the Eastern Cherokees. 48 These tribes
were excluded because each had recognized tribal governments and were
capable of handling the issues of law enforcement through their own
governmental systems. 49
Thus, Cherokee, North Carolina, never
established a Court of Indian Offenses despite federal Indian policy in the
1880s. One explanation for the decision to not create a CFR court in
Cherokee at that time may primarily be attributed to the fact that North
Carolina, due to the continuing and unresolved issue of citizenship of
Cherokee tribal members, was prosecuting tribal members in its state courts
for crimes which occurred on Cherokee tribal lands."

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 104-25.
Id. at 120.
Id. at 141.
See 18 U.S.C.§ 1153 (2018).
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).

46. HAGAN, supra note 28, at 141-42 ("But the courts of these Indians had been
diminishing in importance for several years as new federal courts had been established or

the jurisdiction of courts in nearby states expanded.").
47. Id. at 149.
48. Id. at 109.
49. See id.
50. See State v. Ta-Cha-Na-Tah, 64 N.C. 614, 615 (1870) ("[A]ll persons within the
State are subject to its criminal law and within the jurisdiction of its courts; if any exception
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C. The Establishmentof the CFR Court in Cherokee
As the United States reexamined the policies related to Indians and
Tribes, Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 ("IRA")
under President Franklin D. Roosevelt.5 1 The IRA "was the culmination of
the reform movement initiated in the 1920s."52 Popular opinion and
governmental policy in the 1930s underwent reexamination and sought to
embrace and foster tribal sovereignty following the catastrophic results
reaped under the Dawes Act of 1887.53 If Tribes could create their own
internal, self-sufficient governments and stabilize their land holdings, then
it was hoped economic development and cultural preservation would take
root and thrive.54 Economic development would foster employment, and
fight poverty, which had always been acute on reservations and was
exacerbated during the dark days of the Great Depression. The IRA
encouraged Tribes to create new constitutions for their governance.55 The
Cherokee tribe of North Carolina voted on December 21, 1934, to organize
their tribe under the IRA, with 700 voting in support of the reorganization
and 101 voting against it. 56 However, when the time came to vote and
approve the new proposed IRA constitution in August 1935, the vote failed
with a tally of 484 against adoption, and 382 for adoption. 57 Based upon
these facts, the Eastern Band has never adopted an IRA constitution but
rather has been initially governed by the 1897 North Carolina Act Related
to the Charter of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians 58 and subsequently
by the 1986 Charter and Governing Document of the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians. 59 The Charter and Governing Document of 1986
continues in effect today and functions as the Eastern Cherokee
Constitution.
exists, it must be shown."); State v. Wolf, 59 S.E. 40, 42 (N.C. 1907) (asserting North
Carolina criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed on Cherokee lands).

51. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5105-5144 (2018).
52. HAGAN, supra note 28, at 150-51.

53. General Allotment Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49-2, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (repealed 2000)). See generally Judith V. Royster, The Legacy
ofAllotment, 27 ARIz. ST. L. J. 1 (1995).
54. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.04 at 254 (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2012 & Supp. 2019) [hereinafter COHEN'S HANDBOOK].
55.

See JOHN R. FINGER, CHEROKEE AMERICANS: THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEES IN

THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 90 (Purdue et al. eds., 1991).
56. See Charles J. Weeks, The Eastern Cherokee and the New Deal, 53 N.C. HIST. REV.

303, 312 (1976).
57. See FINGER, supra note 55, at 90.

58. 1896 N.C. Sess. Laws 418.
59. CHEROKEE, N.C., REs. NO. 132 (May 8, 1986).
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Decades after the failed IRA Constitution vote of 1935, the Cherokee
tribal government embarked upon a path to re-establish the Cherokee court
following its destruction in 1835. With legislationpromulgatedby Cherokee
Tribal Council in 1978, a Cherokee CFRcourt was created. 60 The language of
this enacting legislation was as follows:
Cherokee Council House
Cherokee, North Carolina
Resolution No. 200 1978
Whereas, the United States Supreme Court in June of 1978 decided United
States v. John, which ruled that federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction over
Indians violating the Major Crimes Act within "Indian Country;" and
Whereas, the North Carolina Attorney General and department ofthe Interior
have ruled that the ruling of United States v. John was applicable to North
Carolina and the Eastern Band of Cherokees; and
Whereas, serious jurisdictional problems have arisen from the disclaimer of
jurisdiction by the State of North Carolina, and the unavailability of federal
law enforcement personnel for the Cherokee Indian Reservation; and
Whereas, it is the opinion of Tribal officials that law enforcement
responsibilities will have to be assumed by the Tribe; and
Whereas, the proper enforcement of laws on the Reservation will require the
establishment of a court system within the Reservation;
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, By the Tribal Council, in annual
Council assembled, with a quorum present, that a CFR Court be established
for and on the Cherokee Indian Reservation, and that the Superintendent of
the Cherokee Agency be directed to formally request the creation of a CFR
Court on the Cherokee Indian reservation from the Secretary of the Interior. 61

Resolution 200 passed unanimously. The passage of Resolution 200
created the first court of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in Cherokee,
North Carolina. The exact political reasons that led to the establishment of
the CFR court in 1978 have been lost to time. However, it can be fairly
surmised from the language in the Resolution that the decision in United
States v. John was the primary legal reason for creating a new court in
Cherokee. 62

60. CHEROKEE, N.C., REs. No. 200 (1978).
61. Id.
62. See generally David B. Sentelle & Melanie T. Morris, CriminalJurisdictionon the
North Carolina Cherokee Indian Reservation-A Tangle of Race and History, 24 W AKE
FOREST L. REv. 335 (1989) (discussing criminal laws as they apply to crimes committed on
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In United States v. John, the issue was about the status of the Choctaw
reservation in Mississippi and whether the reservation was Indian country,
which would determine whether the state courts had jurisdiction over the
criminal charges brought against John. 63 The removal history of the
Choctaw tribe in Mississippi was similar to that of the Eastern Cherokee in
North Carolina.' The John court confronted the same question regarding
the status of the Indian lands where, similar to the status of the Cherokees'
land in North Carolina, a tribe was removed from their lands by treaty, but
some tribal members remained.6 5 Subsequently, those remnants of the
Choctaw tribe were eventually, through administrative agency actions and
court decisions, treated and recognized by the federal government as
Indians residing on Indian lands.66 The John Court held that the Choctaw
lands in Mississippi were Indian country as defined by federal law, and as
such, the Major Crimes Act 7 applied to crimes committed by the Choctaw
on their lands.68 The Cherokee tribe concluded that Cherokee lands in North
Carolina were also Indian lands.6 9 If Cherokee lands, applying the legal
reasoning from the John decision, were Indian lands, then the State of North
Carolina could no longer assert jurisdiction over tribal defendants.
The John decision was correct, and Cherokee governmental leadership
understood the John opinion and how its legal reasoning applied to them.
Moreover, it is equally important to note that the John opinion, authored by
Justice Blackmun, specifically cited United States v. Wright, which in 1931
determined that the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians was a federally
recognized Indian tribe.70 Thus, it follows from these decisions that the
state courts of North Carolina would no longer have jurisdiction over crimes
committed by Cherokee Indians on Cherokee lands.
From 1980 onwards, the CFR court heard cases and resolved matters that
daily impacted the lives of Cherokee tribal members. While the CFR court
was incredibly important and provided a forum for the resolution of disputes
in a safe and dedicated judicial forum, the very nature of a CFR court had
weaknesses. Primarily, a CFR court is a court of limited jurisdiction. A
the Cherokee Reservation in North Carolina and how the John decision impacted prior
precedent).

63. See United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 635 (1978).
64. See, e.g., ARTHUR H. DEROSIER, JR., THE REMOVAL OF THE CHOCTAW INDIANS

(1981).
65.
66.
67.
68.

See John, 437 U.S. at 638-47.
See id. at 653-54.
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
See John, 437 U.S. at 649.

69. See CHEROKEE, N.C., REs. No. 200 (1978).

70. John, 437 U.S. at 653 (citing United States v. Wright, 53 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1931)).
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tribal court, conversely, is a court founded on the inherent sovereignty of a
tribe.
Soon, the Cherokee of North Carolina would address these
shortcomings and embark upon an ambitious endeavor to create a Cherokee
tribal court.
D. The Reestablishment of the Cherokee Tribal Court
Following the sad history of the Courts of Indian Offenses, Congress
is now supportive of tribe-created tribal courts based upon their inherent
tribal sovereignty. 7' Under the terms of the CFR, when a tribe establishes
a tribal court by operation of law, it supersedes any existing CFR court. 72
That is what happened in Cherokee. In the late 1990s, with the increased
visitors and accelerated involvement of the tribe in commerce that
accompanied the introduction of casino gaming to Cherokee, the Eastern
Band established a tribal court. Or maybe it is more accurate to say that the
Cherokee Tribal Court was reestablished, if we remember that it first existed
from 1820 to 1835.73 Notwithstanding the unfathomable events that befell
the Cherokee people in the 1830s, some 165 years later, the Eastern Band
of Cherokee Indians emerged steadfastly proud and unrepentant, as
manifested in the creation of the new Cherokee Tribal Court.
The modern Cherokee Tribal Court was reestablished in 1999. The
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians' Tribal Court began operation in 2000.
The original process of creating the Tribal Court and drafting legislation
was set in motion by Chief Joyce Dugan, who began the 638 compacting
process. 74 Chief Leon Jones, following his election, finalized the legislation
71. See 25 U.S.C. § 3601(4)-(6) (2018) ("(4) Indian tribes possess the inherent authority
to establish their own form of government, including tribal justice systems; (5) tribal justice
systems are an essential part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for
ensuring public health and safety and the political integrity of tribal governments; (6)
Congress and the Federal courts have repeatedly recognized tribal justice systems as the
appropriate forums for the adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property

rights .... "); 25 U.S.C. § 3651(5)-(7) (2018). ("(5) tribal justice systems are an essential
part of tribal governments and serve as important forums for ensuring the health and safety

and the political integrity of tribal governments; (6) Congress and the Federal courts have
repeatedly recognized tribal justice systems as the most appropriate forums for the
adjudication of disputes affecting personal and property rights on Native lands; (7)
enhancing tribal court systems and improving access to those systems serves the dual Federal

goals of tribal political self-determination and economic self-sufficiency.").
72. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.104(a)(2) (2008); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and
FundamentalFairness:Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. COLO. L. REv. 225
(2013) [hereinafter Indian Courts].
73. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying discussion.

74.

CHEROKEE,

N.C., REs. No. 631 (June 28, 1999) (authorizing Principal Chief Dugan

to submit an application to contract the court system under a Public Law 93-638 contract
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for the Tribal Court.7 5 Six hundred thirty-eight contract funds allocated to
the CFR court are now used to support the salaries and operating expenses
associated with the Tribal Court. 76 On October 12, 1999, Ordinance No. 29
was submitted to the Tribal Council.77 The Tribal Council passed an
amended version of Ordinance No. 29, creating a Tribal Court in Cherokee
on January 6, 2000.78 In creating a tribal court, the Cherokee tribe also
created a new Judicial Code, which was subsequently adopted and codified
under Cherokee Code Chapter 7.79 The Cherokee tribe was a leader in the
law and courts for the whole United States in the 1800s. What occurred in
2000 was simply a thoughtful and concerted effort to draw from the tribe's
history and reestablish those principles long ago deemed sacrosanct by the
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.
Today, the Tribal Court is composed of two divisions: trial and
appellate. 80 In the trial division, all types of cases are heard, including
criminal, civil, domestic, and juvenile matters. Most matters in the trial
division are adjudicated by bench trials if the defendant elects to waive a jury
trial. 81 If the defendant exercises their right to a trial by jury, then, in
82
accordance with both the Indian Civil Rights Act and Cherokee law, a
83
The
six-person jury will hear the offense charged and render a verdict.
three
of
a
panel
in
sits
which
Court,
Supreme
of
a
consists
division
appellate
justices to hear appeals from the trial division. 84 All tribal judges are
required to have a North Carolina attorney license. 85 With the creation of a
tribal court and a tribal judiciary, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians'
Tribal Court is recognized as a leader in all of Indian country.

effective October 1, 1999, or as soon thereafter as the transition might occur) (on file with
author).

75. See CHEROKEE CODE § 7-15 (2000).
76. See Id.

(The effective date of the Indian Self-Determination and Educational

Assistance Act, Public Law 93-638 Contract for the tribal court was April 1, 2000.)
77. Eastern Band of Cherokee Nation, N.C., Ordinance No. 29 (Jan. 6, 2000). [Editors'
Note: Because of COVID-19 restrictions, Campbell Law Review was unable to review this
source.]

78. Id. This new legislation passed, with 63 votes for, 31 votes against, and 6 votes
absent.
79. See CHEROKEE CODE ch. 7 (2000).
80. See CHEROKEE CODE § 7-1(a) (2000).

81. See CHEROKEE CODE § 15 app. A, R. 8 (2020).
82. See CHEROKEE CODE § 15-7 (2000) (incorporating the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968,25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303).
83. See CHEROKEE CODE § 15, app. A, R. 9(e) (2015).
84. See CHEROKEE CODE §§ 7-1(b), -2(e), -5 (2000).
85. See CHEROKEE CODE § 7-5(c) (2000).
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The grant of jurisdiction to the Cherokee Tribal Court is broad: "The
Judicial Branch shall not have jurisdiction over matters in which the exercise
of jurisdiction has been specifically prohibited by a binding decision of the
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit or by an Act of Congress." 86 Thus, the only test that should
be applied by the Cherokee tribal court is whether jurisdiction exists under
Cherokee law and is not otherwise prohibited by the federal courts or
Congress. 87
Today, the Cherokee Tribal Court functions consistently with the
historical norms and traditions of the Cherokee tribe. As one of the first
tribes to establish a formal court system in the early 1800s, the Cherokee have
a long traditionofusing an independent judicial model based on the American
system.
The modern Cherokee Tribal Court is also consistent with the
customs of the Cherokee prior to the establishment of the formal court
system. While it is true the Cherokee Tribal Court no longer enforces the law
of vengeance, 88 and retribution is not meted out with the execution of one
clan member for the life of a member of another clan, there exist aspects of
the modern Cherokee Tribal Court that honor and respect the traditional ways
of the Cherokee people. "Protection of the people from crime is one of the
core functions of government. Without safety, individuals cannot flourish,
seek education or pursue other life goals." 89 The Cherokee tribal
government must protect all its members and make Cherokee lands safe for
everyone. And in providing a forum for dispute resolution, this important
civic function is accomplished. Historically, the Cherokee handled these
transgressions-which we categorize today as criminal violations-through
the clan system. The nature of the clan system was such that it afforded the
clans a speaker on their behalf Any resulting resolutions achieved during
clan negotiations ensured fairness. This dispute forum is the essence of the
Cherokee Tribal Court today. Those called to the court have a voice, and
should they desire, they also have access to assistance from someone trained
in the law who can speak on their behalf Individuals know that when the
matter concludes, regardless of the outcome, everyone will have had a fair
hearing and opportunity to discuss their grievances. These same principles
were used by the Cherokee in its clan system even before the United States
existed.

86. CHEROKEE CODE § 7-2(c) (2000).
87. See CHEROKEE CODE §§ 7-2(a)-(c) (2000).
88. See REID, supra note 1, at 73-84.
89. Angela R. Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. REv. 1564,
1597 (2016) (citing Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in LiberalDemocracy, 7 BUFF.
CR[M. L. REv. 307, 352-56 (2004)).
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III. TRIBAL COURT EXHAUSTION
With the reestablishment of the Cherokee Tribal Court, a modern
forum now exists to resolve disputes. The Cherokee court system today
possesses many aspects and attributes that benefit the public. Principles of
full faith and credit and comity, as well as the ability to transfer cases
between the Cherokee and North Carolina state courts, are desirable,
time-saving, and cost-efficient doctrines. Additionally, the doctrine of
tribal court exhaustion is of paramount importance to the daily operation of
tribal courts. As one ruminates over these rich tableaux of doctrines and
policies that is the modern-day lifeblood of tribal courts throughout the
United States, the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion can best be described
as first among equals. A thorough discussion of this doctrine and its effect
on the Cherokee Tribal Court is therefore the next topic of this Article.
A. The Doctrine of Tribal Court Exhaustion
The rule of tribal court exhaustion is a judicially created policy from
the United States Supreme Court. This judicial rule is grounded in the
theory of comity and arises when a matter involves both the federal and
tribal sovereigns, and both court systems share concurrent jurisdiction over
the claim. 90 The general concept of tribal court exhaustion requires that all
remedies be fully pursued in tribal court before litigants may seek redress
in the federal court system. In turn, the federal courts will decline to hear
cases until after a final tribal decision and decisions on any appeals are
entered. Allowing the tribal court the ability to review the case completely
through the doctrine of exhaustion affords the tribal court the opportunity
"to rectify any errors it may have made." 9 1
In National Farmers Union, the Supreme Court first held that nontribal members must exhaust tribal remedies before bringing a federal claim
against the tribal court. 92 The Supreme Court expanded that exhaustion
93
doctrine in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante. In Iowa Mutual, the
Court suggested that tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers for cases
arising on tribal lands was "presumptive."9 4 That case involved the question
90. See Hunter Cox, ICRA Habeas Corpus Relief A New HabeasJurisprudencefor the
post-Oliphant World?, 5 AM. INDIAN L.J. 596, 625 (2017) (citing Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. v.

Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985)).
91. Valenzuela v. Silversmith, 699 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Nat'l
Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 857).
92. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 856-57.

93. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
94. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 18; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Consent, 8

STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 103 (2012) [hereinafter Tribal Consent].
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of whether, as a matter of comity, defendants should exhaust tribal court
remedies when a case has already begun in tribal court and the defendants
filed suit in federal court. 95 Also, in Iowa Mutual the Supreme Court
directed that the tribal appellate courts must be involved in any meaningful
final decision. "At a minimum ... tribal appellate courts must have the
opportunity to review the determinations of the lower tribal courts" before
either party can seek to invoke federal jurisdiction. 96 After exhaustion, a
party may challenge the tribal court jurisdiction in the federal court. 97 This
clarification that tribal appellate courts should complete their process of
review, and not just the cessation of litigation at the trial level in the tribal
forum, provided much needed guidance to the practitioner. Therefore,
should a litigant, in a claim arising out of events on tribal land, wish to seek
review in the United District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, they must first wait for and pursue their appeal to the Cherokee
Supreme Court.
Moreover, what is equally important about tribal court exhaustion is that
federal courts are required to defer to the determination of the meaning and
interpretation of tribal law once the decision by the tribal court has been
made.98
Just as state courts are the final arbiters of the meaning of state law, so are
tribal courts the final arbiters of the meaning of tribal law. While the
Supreme Court has held that the breadth of tribal court jurisdiction is a
federal question, it is for the tribal court to determine both what its law is
99
and the scope of its own jurisdiction.

It follows that if the tribal court has jurisdiction, the exhaustion
doctrine will not allow for the merits of the case to be re-litigated in the

95. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 16-17.
96. Id. at 17; see also Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Ct., 566 F.3d 842, 847
(9th Cir. 2009) (exhaustion required full trial and appeal); Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 1999) (plaintiff's failure to exhaust appellate
review was due to failure to timely appeal tribal court decision).
97. See Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower CourtsAfter
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward A Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts
by the FederalJudicialSystem, 75 MINN. L. REV. 259, 299-306 (1993).
98. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19; see also Prescott v. Little Six, Inc., 387 F.3d

753, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2004); Basil Cook Enters., Inc. v. St. Regis Mohawk Tribe, 117 F.3d
61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
99. CoHEN's HANDBOOK, supra note 54, at

§

7.04[3]; see also Fredericks v.

Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164,169 (N.D. 1990) (holding
that once a tribe renders a legal determination directly addressing an issue of tribal law, state
courts are not permitted to review that decision in a subsequent proceeding).
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federal court. 00 Also, the doctrine of exhaustion of tribal court remedies is
10
not simply limited to challenges to the jurisdiction of a tribal court. ' The
Ninth Circuit uses an expansive interpretation of tribal court exhaustion in
10 2
all cases where issues that include tribal affairs of any kind are present.
What is interesting about the Ninth Circuit approach is that its expansive
approach is also used for off-reservation and outside Indian country
cases. 103 Moreover, like some circuits, there need not be a pending tribal
court proceeding before exhaustion is required, provided a reasonable
argument can be made that the tribal court has jurisdiction.104 It should be
noted that the Tenth Circuit uses a similarly broad interpretation of tribal
court exhaustion, holding NationalFarmers"almost always" requires tribal
court exhaustion when a case arises from events which occurred on an
Indian reservation.105
The tribal exhaustion rule applies to cases involving breach of
contract,106 trespass,'07 tort,' 08 hazardous construction against a tribal
housing authority, 109 the scope and application of the Tribe's legislative
jurisdiction," 0 and cases that challenge the scope and applicability of a
Some courts have even sent the United
tribe's sovereign immunity."'
100. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480 U.S. at 19; Burell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th

Cir. 2006).
101. See

CoHEN's HANDBOOK,

supra note 54, at § 7.04[3].

102. See Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., L.L.C. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc., 715 F.3d 1196, 1200

(9th Cir. 2013); see also Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir.
2008); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992); Wellman v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 815 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1987).
103. See Grand Canyon SkywalkDev., L.L.C., 715 F.3d at 1200; Marceau, 540 F.3d at

920-21; Stock West Corp., 964 F.2d at 919-20.
104. See Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev., L.L.C., 715 F.3d at 1200; Marceau, 540 F.3d at

920-21; Stock West Corp., 964 F.2d at 919-20.
105. See Texaco, Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1378 (10th Cir. 1993).
106. See Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 212 F. Supp. 2d 163 (W.D.N.C. 2002); see
also Colombe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 747 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2014); Grand Canyon
Skywalk Dev., L.L.C., 715 F.3d at 1196; A & A Concrete, Inc. v. White Mountain Apache

Tribe, 781 F.2d 1411, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1986); Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated
Tribes of the Fort Berthold Rsrv., 27 F.3d 1294, 1299-1300 (8th Cir. 1994); Texaco, Inc., 5

F.3d at 1375.
107. See United States v. Tsosie (Tsosie II), 92 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 1996); see also
United States v. Turtle Mountain Hous. Auth., 816 F.2d 1273, 1275-77 (8th Cir. 1987).

108. See Whitebird v. Kickapoo Hous. Auth., 751 F. Supp. 928, 930 (D. Kan. 1990).
109. See Marceau, 540 F.3d at 920.

110. See Middlemist v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Interior, 824 F. Supp. 940, 944 (D.
Mont. 1993), aff'd 19 F.3d 1318 (10th Cir. 1994).
111. See Sharber v. Spirit Mountain Gaming, 343 F.3d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 2003); see also
Davis v. Mille Lacs Band Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 1999). See
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States to tribal court when issues arose where the Federal Government
sought to enforce federal law against a tribal member." 2 The doctrine of
tribal court exhaustion has also been held to apply to cases and controversies
which arose in off-reservation disputes and actions."13 Exhaustion was also
required over a case involving a non-Indian who challenged the authority
of the tribe to regulate her on-reservation business even though the business
owner was non-Indian." 4 Tribal taxation and employment preference have
also been subject to tribal court exhaustion. 1 5
Some actions can have concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction. As
explained by Justice Blackmun, "[T]he Court has recognized coextensive
state and tribal civil jurisdiction where the exercise of concurrent authority
does not do violence to the rights of either sovereign."16 Jackson County
ex rel. Annette Jackson v. Swayney exemplifies this-the Supreme Court of
North Carolina found that the state court had concurrent jurisdiction for
recoupment of child support payments made on behalf of the Department
of Social Services for past public assistance even though the parties were
all members of the tribe and resided on the Cherokee Indian Reservation." 7
Because the requirement of the child support enforcement program under
42 U.S.C. § 602(27) was mandatory against everyone in the state, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina concluded they could exercise concurrent

generally Malaterre v. Amerind Risk Mgmt., 373 F. Supp. 2d 980, 981-82 (D.N.D. 2005)
(holding the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion applies to cases that involve reservation

affairs which are brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201); but see
Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 29 (1st
Cir. 2000).
112. See United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1992) (trespassing on
tribal lands alleged to have violated federal trespass statute); United States v. Tsosie (Tsosie
1), 849 F. Supp. 768, 769 (D.N.M. 1994) (ownership of land at issue under the General
Allotment Act).

113. Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1992)
(requiring tribal court exhaustion where interpleader of bank in contract dispute between
tribe and management company, even though all banking activities occurred off the

reservation); Stock West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring
exhaustion in case involving legal malpractice claim where action occurred off-reservation
but directly dealt with reservation matters).

114. See Kaul v. Wahquahboshkuk, 838 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D. Kan. 1993; see also
Middlemist, 824 F. Supp. at 947 (supporting tribe enforcement of tribal conservation
ordinance on lands owned by non-Indians but located within the boundaries of the tribal
reservation).
115. Duncan Energy Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Rsrv., 27 F.3d
1294, 1300-01 (8th Cir. 1994).
116. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408, 466 (1989).
117. See Jackson Cnty. ex rel. Jackson v. Swayney, 352 S.E.2d 413, 414, 418 (1987).
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state court jurisdiction over these matters on the grounds that federal law
applied to allcitizens." 8
B. The Cherokee Tribal Court & The Principlesof Tribal Court
Exhaustion
1. Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson (1993): Abstention
The first Cherokee case in federal court to address tribal court
exhaustion was Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson in 1993.119 In Tom 's
the action arose out of a claim and delivery for slot machines where the
0
Tom's, a Georgia
creditor claimed nonpayment by the debtor. 12
Corporation, leased gaming machines to Cuthbertson, who through a
contractual agreement operated a bingo hall pursuant to federal law and a
121
Cuthbertson
Cherokee tribal management agreement on Cherokee lands.
failed to make payments and agreed that Tom's could collect the
machines. 122 Tom's alleged that they were told by the Cherokee Police
Department that, before they collected the machines, they would need to
adhere to the "legal process." 12 ' However, Tom's elected to bring their suit
in the federal court, which found that "[t]he case at hand involve[d] a
contract dispute between two non-Indians operating a gaming establishment
on the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indian Reservation pursuant to a gaming
license and ordinances established by the Tribe.""' The court then observed
that Cuthbertson operated gaming at this establishment under Cherokee law,
that Cuthbertson was a disclosed agent for the tribe, that this issue had a
"direct impact on Indians or their property," and, "[t]herefore, the fact that
the contractual parties are non-Indians is not dispositive of the jurisdictional
issue."" Importantly, the court emphasized that "the fact that the dispute
118. See id.

Note that in the opinion of the author, the Swayney decision is now

questionable because the discussion of jurisdiction was based on the grant of civil
jurisdiction in a CFR court under federal law and not a tribal court based upon inherent tribal
sovereignty which exists today. Also, the misapplication of the Supreme Court of North
Carolina in undertaking an analysis of a Public Law-280 state's jurisdiction over the
Cherokee tribe when, in fact, North Carolina has never been a Public Law-280 state is

dubious. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 85, 98 Stat. 342 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 28
U.S.C. § 1360, and 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326).
119. Tom's Amusement Co. v. Cuthbertson, 816 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
120. See id. at 404.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id.
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at hand involve[d] non-Indians d[id] not prohibit the tribal court from
exercising civil jurisdiction over this matter. "126
The court, having found that the Cherokee CFR court had civil
jurisdiction because gaming directly impacted the economic function of the
tribe, examined Cherokee Code section 1-2(d)(e) to determine whether the
Cherokee tribe and its court intended to exercise civil jurisdiction over such
matters. 127 The federal court then found that Tom's had contractually
"engaged in commerce" onthe Cherokee lands "andthus ha[d] subjected itself
to the civil jurisdiction of the tribal court." 2 Additionally, the federal court
found that it had federal jurisdiction under both diversity jurisdiction and
federal question bases. 129 Notwithstanding this determination, Judge
Voorhees then engaged in an analysis of the doctrine of tribal court
exhaustion.1 30 "Nonetheless, the Court will abstain at this time from an
exercise of its jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has developed the doctrine
of abstention of federal jurisdiction pending exhaustion of tribal remedies
'to further the longstanding federal policy of encouraging tribal

self-government, inwhichtribal courts playa vital role."'13' Withhisdecision
the court stayed the federal action and sent the matter to the tribal court for
disposition. 3 2
It should also be noted that there was not a pending action in the CFR
court at the time of the decision. Chief Judge Voorhees explained:
The Court notes it is unaware of any pending action involving these parties
before the tribal court. Nonetheless, the Court finds its review of cases
involving concurrent jurisdiction over civil matters arising from business
relations on Indian land dictates abstention pending a determination by the
tribal court on the issue of whether it has jurisdiction over this civil
proceeding. 133

Tom's established the principle that the Cherokee tribal court should
hear the matters that directly impact the tribe-regardless of tribal

126. Id.
127. See id. at 405-06.
128. Id. at 406.
129. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
130. Id. at 406-07.
131. Id. at 406 (quoting Tamiami Partners, Ltd. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla.,
788 F. Supp. 566, 569 (S.D. Fla. 1992)).
132. See id. at 407.
133. Id.; see also Crawford v. Genuine Parts Co., 947 F.2d 1405, 1408 (9th Cir. 1991)
(deciding the district court improperly denied transfer to the tribal court where the dispute
"arose on the reservation" and one of the NationalFarmersexceptions did not apply).
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34
membership-and that deference from the federal court is warranted.1'
Supporting tribal court exhaustion is further buttressed when a party clearly
demonstrates consent to do business on Cherokee lands and, in doing so,
submits themselves to the jurisdiction of the Cherokee tribal court.

2. Warn v. Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians (1994): Inherent
Sovereign Power of the Cherokee Tribe
Another case involving the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians directly
addressed the issue of tribal court exhaustion in 1994.15 In Warn v. Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians, husband and wife lessees, the Warns, operated
the "Yogi in the Smokies" campground, which was located on Cherokee
tribal lands in the Big Cove community."' The Warns signed a lease with
the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in 1985.137 The lease was thereafter
approved by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the language of the lease
specifically provided that the parties would settle all disputes in the
Cherokee court system and that the parties would "subject themselves to the
38
Soon thereafter, a
jurisdiction of the Cherokee Indian Tribal Court."1
dispute arose between a neighboring enrolled member, which ultimately
resulted in the Cherokee tribe banishing both Richard and Leah Warn from
Cherokee lands.1 39 The Warns sued in federal court, claiming breach of
contract, violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, and violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.140 The federal court determined it had subject matter jurisdiction
over the contract claims because diversity of parties existed, with the
Cherokee tribe being federally recognized as sovereign, and the issues
before the court directly impacting Indians and tribal lands.141 However,
after examining the two claims based upon breach of contract, the federal
court dismissed these causes of action against the tribe and its council
42
was no
members under the doctrine of sovereign immunity' -there
express waiver of sovereign immunity in the lease by the Eastern Band of

134. See Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Ct., 566 F.3d 842, 848-49 (9th Cir.
2009) (discussing direct impact to a tribe where a nonmember set a forest fire that burned
thousands of acres of tribal lands).
135. See Warn v. E. Band of Cherokee Indians, 858 F. Supp. 524 (W.D.N.C. 1994).
136. Id. at 525.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 525-26.
140. Id. at 526.
141. Id.
142. The sovereign immunity doctrine immunizes a government from suit without its
consent. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 350 (1907).
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Cherokee Indians.14 3 Tribes, as distinct and independent sovereigns that
existed prior to the establishment of the United States, enjoy sovereign
immunity and "have long been recognized as possessing the common-law
immunity from suit traditionally enjoyed by sovereign powers.""4
Regarding the other defendants named in their individual capacities,
the federal court abstained from exercising jurisdiction based upon the
doctrine of tribal court exhaustion.14 5 The court, in discussing the doctrine
of tribal court exhaustion, explained:
[A]lthough this Court has jurisdiction over the causes of action based on
breach of contract, it will abstain from exercising that jurisdiction pending
the exhaustion of Tribal Court remedies. "Regardless of the basis for
jurisdiction, the federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a
federal court to stay its hand in order to give the tribal court a 'full
opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction."' Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 480
U.S. at 16, 107 S. Ct. at 976 (citations omitted). The parties contracted that
disputes over the lease agreement would be resolved in the Tribal Court
forum. The fact that the Plaintiffs are non-Indians does not prohibit the
Tribal Court from exercising civil jurisdiction over this matter. Stock West
Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1992) .... The Plaintiffs have
actively engaged in commerce with the [Eastern Band of Cherokee] Tribe
and have subjected themselves to the civil jurisdiction of the [Cherokee]
tribal court. FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 943, 111 S. Ct. 1404, 113 L. Ed. 2d 459
(1991).146

Based on this reasoning, the court dismissed the individual contract
claims "on the grounds of abstention, the Plaintiffs having failed to exhaust
Tribal Court remedies." 14 7 In so doing, the matter was properly placed back
in the Cherokee tribal court for a determination by the tribal court, with
deference and respect to the sovereignty of the Eastern Band of Cherokee
Indians.
The unique sovereign status of the Cherokee tribe played an
important role in the disposition of this case. Moreover, the federal court

143. See Warn, 58 F. Supp. at 553.
144. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing Turner v. United
States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919); United States v. U.S. Fid. and Guar., Co., 309 U.S. 506,
512-13 (1940); Puyallup Tribe v. Wash. Dep't of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977)).
145. See Warn, 858 F. Supp. at 527.
146. Id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 488 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
exhaustion was required in the Navajo Nation Tribal Court over non-Indian defendant
because the conduct at issue directly impacted the welfare and economic security of the

Navajo Nation); accord Ford Motor Co. v. Kayenta Dist. Ct., No. SC-CV-33-07, 2008
Navajo Sup. LEXIS 8, at *1-2 (Navajo Dec. 18, 2008) (resulting opinion from the Navajo
court in Todecheene after declination by the federal court).

147. Warn, 858 F. Supp. at 528.
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recognized that self-governance and the ability to resolve disputes in the
Cherokee court is simply one facet of Cherokee tribal sovereignty. The
Warns voluntarily elected to do business on Cherokee lands; in doing so, they
expressly subjected themselves to the civil jurisdiction of the tribal court. It
was incumbent, therefore, for the federal court to abstain from exercising
federal court jurisdiction over the issues and, under the doctrine of tribal court
exhaustion, allow the matters to be fully litigated in the Cherokee tribal
court.
3. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Bradley (2002): The
Principle of Comity
The next Cherokee case where tribal court exhaustion arose was in
Fidelity & Guarantee Insurance Co. v. Bradley. 48 In that case, the
defendant was sued in the tribal court for breach of contract over a tribally
initiated construction project on tribal lands to which Fidelity stood as surety
on a performance bond.1 49 While the suit was pending in the tribal court,
Fidelity filed the cause of action in the federal court.'" 0 Bradley sought
dismissal of the federal action under the doctrine of tribal court exhaustion
because it appeared from the posture of the case that the issues of
indemnification were also pending in the tribal court suit.'
The federal court first found that the tribal court had jurisdiction over
the matter even though Fidelity was a non-Indian entity. 5 2 The court
explained:
The Tribal Court clearly has jurisdiction over the dispute at issue; a dispute
between a non-Indian which entered into a consensual contractual
relationship with an Indian for a performance bond to cover the construction
of the Cherokee Ceremonial Grounds Entrance on tribal land and for the
53
benefit of the Tribe.

Turning next to the issue of tribal court exhaustion, Judge Lacy
Thornburg wrote that "[t]he Magistrate Judge found that this Court should not
abstain in favor of tribal exhaustion primarily because there is no pending
action in tribal court between Fidelity and Bradley. The case law, however,
mandates that this court do so.""54 After review of National Farmers and
Iowa Mutual, the court explained:
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Bradley, 212 F. Supp. 2d 163 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id. at 166.
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[N]othing in the facts here presented ... would excuse the longstanding
policy of tribal court exhaustion. The construction project was on land
owned by the Tribe; indeed, the initial construction contract was between
Bradley and the Tribe. Tribal funds were used to pay for the construction
and thus, any alleged breach thereof would directly impact tribal economic
security and health. And, Fidelity entered into a consensual commercial
relationship with a member of the Tribe.15 5

Even though there was no pending suit directly between Bradley and
Fidelity in tribal court, it was nevertheless obvious that, because Fidelity had
indemnified Bradley as the builder, the same issues of fact would be litigated
between Bradley and the Tribe in its breach claim. 156 If Bradley did not
breach the contract, the question would then arise as to whether Fidelity was
reasonable in its decision to take over the project and complete the
construction. 157 To proceed in federal court prior to the resolution of the
contract breach in tribal court could lead to contradictory results. The court
stated:
The tribal exhaustion doctrine is not jurisdictional in nature, but, rather, is a
product of comity and related considerations. Where applicable, this
prudential doctrine has force whether or not an action actually is pending in a
tribal court. Moreover, the doctrine applies even though the contested claims
are to be defined substantively by state or federal law.15 8

Today, whether a court will follow the exhaustion doctrine when no
case is pending in the tribal court finds divergent views among the federal
circuits. The Second Circuit requires that there be an active suit pending in
the tribal court before tribal court exhaustion doctrine will be applied.159
However, this approach is in the minority. The Eight, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits require tribal court exhaustion even if there is no pending action in
the tribal court.16'
Considering the decision in Tom's and the language in
Bradley, which cites United States v. Tsosie, 16 1even though the issue has not

155. Id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 166-67 (quoting Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck
Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2000)).
159. See Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 2001).
160. See Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 2008); United
States v. Tsosie (Tsosie If), 92 F.3d 1037, 1042-43 (10th Cir. 1996); Duncan Energy Co. v.
Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Rsrv., 27 F.3d 1294, 1300 (8th Cir. 1994); Stock
West Corp. v. Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc); Brown v. Washoe
Hous. Auth., 835 F.2d 1327, 1328 (10th Cir. 1988); Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux
Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 673-74 (8th Cir. 1986).
161. Tsosie II, 92 F.3d at 1041.
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been addressed by the Fourth Circuit, tribal court exhaustion should apply
to the Cherokee tribal court even when there is no pending lawsuit in the
tribal court. This deference to tribal sovereignty allows the tribal courts to
hear these cases and more robustly develop tribal law and precedent that
benefits both federal and tribal court systems and the attorneys who practice
in the field of Indian law.
Bradley recognized that, while there was not an action pending
between the same parties, there did exist a suit in the tribal court dealing
with similar, associated claims. 6 2 Thus, recognizing the importance of the
doctrine of comity in Bradley, the federal court avoided the possibility of
inconsistent judgments. 163 This same adherence to tribal court exhaustion
bestowed deference and respect on the Cherokee tribal court and recognized
that the issues directly impacted the tribe's interests since the land, monies,
and project were on Cherokee lands, and Fidelity consented to do business
Simultaneously, Judge
in Cherokee on a Cherokee tribal project.
the added benefit of
has
decision
Thornburg's thoughtful and correct
promoting judicial economy.
C. Exceptions to the Doctrine of Tribal CourtExhaustion
The doctrine of tribal court exhaustion is not absolute and exceptions
exist to the rule, including: when the actions of the tribal court harass the
party or jurisdiction is claimed in bad faith;" when a tribal court asserts
jurisdiction in violation of an express legal jurisdictional prohibition
assumed by the federal government such as issues associated with nuclear
power;' 6 5 or when appellate review would be futile because there is no
forum, the relief sought is unavailable in that forum, or the reviewing forum

162. See Bradley, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
163. See id. at 167; see also Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50 (Conn. 1998) (demonstrating
conflicting applications of comity by a state court in staying a suit brought against the tribe
under the tribal court exhaustion doctrine). But see Meyer & Assocs. v. Coushatta Tribe of

La., 992 So. 2d 446 (La. 2008) (declining to dismiss contract action against tribe based on
exhaustion doctrine where the specific terms of the contract required that the contract be
construed according to the laws of Louisiana, the tribe expressly waived its sovereign
immunity, and the suit dealt with a commercial matter and not the internal, political integrity

of the tribe).
164. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21

(1985).
165. See id.; see also El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 487-88 (1999)
(finding damages sought based upon a claim arising out of "nuclear incidents" fell under the

Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210); Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau Of Indian Affs., 867 F.2d
1094, 1098 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that Congress intended for federal court to be the
exclusive forum for violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
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is biased.' 6 6 Also, in subsequent rulings, the Supreme Court has added a
fourth exception. Where it is clear the tribal court lacks jurisdiction, as
established in the Strate v. A-i Contractors and Nevada v. Hicks line of
since
tribal
court
exhaustion
is
unnecessary
decisions,
"exhaustion ... would serve no purpose other than delay."' 67 Following the
decisions in Strate and Hicks, lower courts have carved out an additional
exception to tribal court exhaustion-when they determine that there is no
"colorable" claim of tribal jurisdiction. 168
Only one exception has been found to affect the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians-futility. In Wildcatt v. Smith, the North Carolina state
court asserted jurisdiction over a child support contempt proceeding that
resulted in the father, who was an enrolled member of the Eastern Band of
Cherokee Indians, being jailed for child support arrearages.' 69 After review,
the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the continued exercise ofstate
jurisdiction unduly infringed upon the sovereignty of the Cherokee Tribe
when the determination of parentage and child support was at issue in a civil
action between two tribal members, living on tribal lands, over a matter
fundamental to the integrity of the tribe-the support of minor enrolled
children of the tribe.1'7 0 When the default judgment was entered against the
defendant on July 15, 1980, adjudging the defendant to be the father of the
minor child, the tribal court did not exist.' 7 ' The Cherokee CFR Court came
into existence on July 28, 1980, approximately two weeks after the Wildcatt
default judgment was entered in the Swain County District Court.17 2
Because there was no tribal court when the default judgment was entered, the
North Carolina Court of Appeals analyzed the unique facts in this case and
determined that "Congress ha[d] not preempted the field of state court
assumption of subject matter jurisdiction over tribes which are without their
own court system."1'7 3 The lack of a tribal court forum is a correct statement

166. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins., 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.

167. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459-60 n.14 (1997); see also Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001).
168. Jackson v. Payday Fin. L.L.C., 764 F.3d 765, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding
exhaustion to not be required when there was no "colorable" claim of tribal jurisdiction over
borrowers who were located off the reservation); see also Elliot v. White Mountain Apache

Tribal Ct., 566 F.3d 842, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2009); Burrell v. Armijo, 456 F.3d 1159, 1168
(10th Cir. 2006).
169. See Wildcatt v. Smith, 316 S.E.2d 870, 872-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
170. See id. at 877.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. Id.
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of the law and the futility exception nearly always finds its footing when a tribe
lacks a valid and working court system. 7 4
What is equally interesting about Wildcatt is how the North Carolina
court then addressed the ancillary issues which arose. On September 5, 1980,
the plaintiff applied to the new CFR court for enforcement of the state court
order, and the Cherokee CFR court domesticated the Swain County
judgment."1 5 Subsequently, the decision to afford full faith and credit to the
76
Swain County judgment was reversed by the Indian Appeals Court.1
During that time, the respective parties sought to resolve their dispute but
were unsuccessful. Finally, a motion for contempt was filed in Swain County
state court, and a hearing was held on May 3, 1983. "? The trial judge in 1983
found the defendant in contempt, calculated his arrears at $6,500.00, and
ordered himj ailed.1 7 8
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, when looking at this second
phase of the litigation, correctly noted that in 1983 the CFR court in
Cherokee was functioning. Because the CFR court existed, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals explained that the further exercise of state
jurisdiction over the Wildcatt issues in 1983 did, in fact, unduly infringe
9
upon the sovereignty of the Cherokee tribe.' 7 Considering how decisions
of the North Carolina state courts would interfere upon the sovereignty of
the Cherokee tribe and the function of Cherokee court, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals declared that further involvement by the state court in the
continuing Wildcatt issues was impermissible. The North Carolina Court
of Appeals declared, "It is clear that any exercise of [North Carolina] state
power after the creation of the [Cherokee] Indian court system would
80
With
unduly infringe upon the tribe's asserted right of self-government."'
this decision, the trial court's judgment from May 3, 1983, was reversed and
remanded.'81
The Wildcatt decision was correct in the analysis applied to the facts
and in the conclusions reached. While there was no tribal court in early
174. See Colombe v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 747 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding
that the tribal appeals court declining to hear the appeal does not give rise to the futility
exception); see also Comstock Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ala. & Coushatta Indian Tribes, 261 F.3d
567, 572-73 (5th Cir. 2001); Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 125 F.3d 621, 622 (8th
Cir. 1997).
175. Wildcatt, 316 S.E.2d at 872.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 877.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 877-78.
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1980, there was a CFR court in 1983. Today the Cherokee Tribal Court,
which is the successor court to the Cherokee CFR court, handles these types
of disputes on a daily basis. Any attempt by North Carolina to assert civil
jurisdiction in such cases today would be erroneous. Allowing the Eastern
Band of Cherokee Indians to regulate their domestic relations is of
paramount importance. Any attempt to interfere with the self-governance
of the Cherokee tribe by the state would be unreasonable, and the Wildcatt
court recognized this important and sacrosanct principle of Indian law.
D. Treatment of the Tribal Courts in the FederalCourts
Also notable is how a federal court would treat a tribal court decision
if, in fact, it engaged in a post-exhaustion review. When asked to review a
dispute between a non-Indian employer and the tribal employment rights
office, the standard applied to the appellate decision from the
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes Court was articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals.1 82 The tribal appellate court affirmed the tribal court order,
which found that non-Indian owned businesses on the Fort Hall reservation
in southeast Idaho were required to adhere to the tribal ordinance that
mandated hiring preferences for Indians under tribal law.' 83 The non-Indian
defendant sought relief and asked for review by the federal court of the tribal
court decision.184 In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit announced what the
standard of review would be in cases of post-exhaustion review of a tribal
court decision.' 85 The findings of fact made by a tribal court are reviewed
under this new test on a "clearly erroneous standard" while the conclusions
of law are scrutinized under the de novo standard of review. 186 More
recently, this same test has been adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Mustang
Production Company when the court explained, "We are persuaded by the
Ninth Circuit's analysis [in FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes]. We hold
that when reviewing tribal court decisions on jurisdictional issues, district
courts should review tribal courts' findings of fact for clear error and
conclusions of law de novo."1 87
Thus, a tribal court decision from the Cherokee Tribal Court should be
reviewed under this standard. Even though there is no case from the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, this standard is a reasonable compromise. The fact
finder is given broad deference in their analysis of the facts and a de novo
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

See FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1313-14 (9th Cir. 1990).
See id. at 1312.
See id. at 1313.
See id. at 1313.
See id.
Mustang Prod. Co. v. Harrison, 94 F.3d 1382, 1384 (10th Cir. 1996).
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review of the conclusions of law limits the invasive nature of the review,
respects tribal court jurisdiction, and does not compromise the legitimate
exercise of tribal sovereignty. This limited review also allows for added
acceptance of the final outcome by the parties. Finally, knowing this
standard encourages the litigants in the tribal court to fully and completely
develop their issues and evidence so that the Cherokee trial and appellate
courts may make the most insightful and robust findings possible.
CONCLUSION

The story of the establishment of the Cherokee court in the 1800s and its
re-birth some 165 years later is replete with both history and relevance to
litigation in the Cherokee, North Carolina, and Federal court systems today.
Helping the practitioner and the public better understand this history is
Of possibly greater import, however, is understanding the
important.
importance of how tribal court exhaustion requires that deference and like
considerations which are also bestowed upon its sister courts be shown to the
Cherokee tribal court. Woe betide the slacker who enters into litigation in
the Cherokee court without fully appreciating the importance ofthe Cherokee
court in particular, tribal courts in general, and how deference to the Cherokee
court profoundly affects the progression of a tribal cause of action. It is hoped
that this Article will assist the practitioner and in turn better serve the interests
ofjustice, promote judicial economy, reduce litigation costs, and bring cases
to a quicker resolution. With these estimable goals foremost in the minds
of everyone, it is hoped that all who seek redress within the Cherokee court
will benefit in the end.
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